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THE MILITARY JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA
REVISITED: A RETURN TO THE STATUS-ONLY
REQUIREMENT FOR COURT-MARTIAL SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down a controversial decision in the area of military law.
This decision dealt with an assessment of the constitutional rights of
individuals serving in the armed forces. In O'Callahan v. Parker,1
the Court held that a military court has jurisdiction over a criminal
case only if the crime was service-connected. Two years later, in
Relford v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks," the
Court enumerated twelve factors that should be used to determine
service-connection. In June of 1987, eighteen years after
O'Callahan, the Court decided the case of Solorio v. United States.'
In Solorio, the Court expressly overruled O'Callahan' and held that
"the jurisdiction of a court-martial5 depends solely on the accused's
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1. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
2. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
3. 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
4. Id. at 2925. In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a court-martial con-
vened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) to try a
member of the armed forces depends on the 'service-connection' of the offense
charged. We hold that it does not, and overrule our earlier decision in
O'Callahan v. Parker.
Id.
5. Court-martial is defined as:
A military court, convened under authority of government and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq., for trying and punishing
offenses committed by members of the armed forces. Courts-martial are courts
of law and courts of justice although they are not part of the Federal Judiciary
established under Article III of the Constitution. They are legislative criminal
courts established in the Armed Forces under the Constitutional Power of Con-
gress to regulate the Armed Forces. Their jurisdiction is entirely penal and dis-
ciplinary. They may be convened by the President, Secretaries of Military De-
partments and by senior commanders specifically empowered by law. The type
(e.g., summary, special, or general) and composition of the courts-martial varies
according to the gravity of offenses. Courts-martial are ad hoc bodies empow-
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status as a member of the Armed Forces, and not on the 'service
connection' of the offense charged."'
This comment examines the subject-matter jurisdiction of mili-
tary courts over crimes committed by soldiers during peacetime, the
due process violations inherent in the system of military justice and
the need to limit the jurisdiction of military courts to a minimum
during peacetime. The following section traces the historical develop-
ment of the military justice system. Section III examines the possible
effects of Solorio, points out the difficulties that military courts and
practitioners experienced in applying the O'Callahan/Relford ser-
vice-connection standard, and discusses the justifications for limiting
court-martial jurisdiction. Section IV proposes alternative methods
for determining court-martial jurisdiction. Finally, section V con-
cludes that the status-only standard expands court-martial subject-
matter jurisdiction impermissibly beyond the constitutional limits im-
posed by O'Callahan and Relford.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Perspective and the Military Justice Act of 1968
"Military establishments throughout history have had their own
systems of criminal law, radically different from the civilian law
.... "Servicemembers are subject to a stricter criminal law, with
less procedural due process rights than those enjoyed by civilian de-
fendants. This more stringent mode of justice is the result of a per-
ceived need for the military to maintain discipline and efficiency
under unusual or exigent conditions. These demands placed upon
the military establishment require that the trial and punishment of
military offenders be swift and unimpeded by certain safeguards oth-
erwise guaranteed civilians.8
"Prior to the Civil War, the military authorities could try ser-
vicemen for various offenses punishable by civilian courts, provided
ered to try only persons who are made constitutionally amenable to such trial by
Act of Congress for offenses punishable under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Generally they are designed to deal with the internal affairs of the mili-
tary when summary command discipline is inadequate to achieve corrective re-
sults, but they have concurrent jurisdiction with civil courts over a wide range of
civil offenses. Appeals are to the Court of Military Appeals.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 320 (5th ed. 1979).
6. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2925.
7. McCoy, Due Process for Servicemen-The Military Justice Act of 1968, 11 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 66 (1969) [hereinafter McCoy, Due Process].
8. Id. See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 413 (T. Cooley, ed. 1884); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
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the charges fit into an offense over which Congress had granted ju-
risdiction to the military."9 During the Civil War, Congress gave to
courts-martial concurrent jurisdiction'0 over certain civilian-type
crimes of violence committed during wartime by military
personnel."
More recently, starting from the middle of this century, the mil-
itary justice system was brought into greater conformity with the ci-
vilian system through the Military Justice Acts of 1948, 1950, and
1968.
Great progress was made in establishing and expanding due
process and equal justice for all soldiers between 1950 and 1970. A
liberalized set of Articles of War was enacted for Army and Air
Force personnel in 1948.12 In 1950, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice'2 was enacted and made applicable to all of the armed forces.
The Code extended to personnel of the other military branches
(Navy, Marines, Coast Guard and National Guard) the new protec-
tions that the 1948 Articles of War had given Army and Air Force
personnel and added other important protections in the area of due
process."' More recently, the Military Justice Act of 1968'" brought
the system of military justice closer to the civilian system. 6
In addition to the Acts, the courts, including the United States
Court of Military Appeals, began to provide additional due process
rights to defendants in the military justice system.'1 Thus, the gap
9. McCoy, Due Process, supra note 7, at 67.
10. Concurrent jurisdiction is defined as:
The jurisdiction of several different tribunals, each authorized to deal with the
same subject-matter at the choice of the suitor. Authority shared by two or more
legislative, judicial, or administrative officers or bodies to deal with the same
subject matter. Jurisdiction exercised by different courts, at same time, over
same subject matter, and within same territory, and wherein litigants may, in
first instance, resort to either court indifferently.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (5th ed. 1979).
11. Act of March 3,1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731; see generally W. WINTHROP, MILITARY
LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1920).
12. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 624, 62 Stat. 604, 639.
13. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-972 (1964).
14. Id.
15. Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub L. No. 90-63.2, 82 Stat. 1335.
16. For an excellent discussion of the Military Justice Act of 1968, see generally Mc-
Coy, Due Process, supra note 7, at 66-105.
For examples of ways in which the military system was made more similar to the civilian
system, see infra note 18.
17. For example, in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), the
United States Supreme Court held that Congress has no power to subject a discharged soldier
to trial by court-martial and thereby deprive him of the constitutional safeguards protecting
persons tried in federal court.
1989]
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between due process for civilians and due process for military per-
sonnel has been greatly narrowed by statutes, court decisions, and
executive actions starting in 1950. The military defendant now en-
joys most of the same constitutionally guaranteed due process rights
accorded to civilians. 8
Action at the congressional level to give greater constitutional
protections to military personnel was paralled by action at the judi-
cial level. The Supreme Court's decision in O'Callahan v. Parker in
1969 repealed a century-old law which gave military courts author-
ity to hear criminal cases by virture of the fact that the offender was
"in the land or naval forces."' 9
B. Subject-matter Jurisdiction of Military Courts
1. The Century Prior to O'Callahan v. Parker
From 1776 to 1863, the jurisdiction of military courts over non-
military offenses2" committed within the United States lacked clear
statutory authorization.2 Then, from 1863 to 1969, court-martial
jurisdiction over non-military offenses was not only legitimatized by
18. McCoy, Due Process, supra note 7, at 69.
Despite these improvements within the military justice system, similarities with due pro-
cess protections available in the civilian court system were not achieved. O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258, 262-63 (1968); Toth, 350 U.S. at 17-18; Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
Article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution recognizes that the need for military disci-
pline allows military courts to dispense with some of the procedural safeguards of article III
trials. The fifth amendment exempts "cases arising in the land or naval forces in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger" from the requirement of prosecution
by indictment and the right to trial by jury. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942).
Military defendants are entitled to the right to indictment by grand jury and trial by petit
jury, the right to bail, and the right to be confronted in non-capital cases with adverse wit-
nesses. McCoy, Due Process, supra note 7, at 69.
Petit jury is defined as "[tihe ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action; so
called to distinguish it from the grand jury." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelling in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
(emphasis added).
20. For the purpose of this comment, non-military offenses are those unrelated to the
individual's status as a soldier, such as robbery, larceny, and rape.
21. McCoy, Equal Justice for Servicemen: The Situation Before and Since O'Callahan
v. Parker, 16 N.Y.L.F. 1, 6 (1970) [hereinafter McCoy, Equal Justice].
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Congress, but also expanded under a series of statutes and court de-
cisions.22 The Act of March 3, 186323 established jurisdiction of
courts-martial over soldiers charged with the following offenses
whether or not the offense in question had an effect on order and
discipline: larceny, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, manslaughter,
rape, and related offenses involving an intent to kill or rape.24 This
expanded jurisdiction was limited to times of war, insurrection and
rebellion, and covered both capital and non-capital offenses.15 The
Act clearly established an unequal system of justice based solely on'
an individual's status as a soldier.2
In 1866, the United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milli-
gan27 placed its stamp of approval on a dual system of justice, with
military personnel being deprived of otherwise inalienable rights
solely because of their status as members of the armed forces. The
Court stated:
The Discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy,
required other and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by
the common law courts; and, in pursuance of the power con-
ferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared the kinds of
trial, and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for of-
fenses committed while the party is in the military or naval ser-
vices. Every one connected with these branches of public service
is amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has created for
their government, and, while thus serving, surrenders his right
to be tried by the civil courts. 8
The dictum in Milligan established the constitutionality of the
1863 Act which extended military jurisdiction to listed non-military
offenses committed by soldiers during wartime. It also served to sup-
port a 1916 statute21 which extended court-martial jurisdiction to
22. McCoy, Equal Justice, supra note 21, at 6. In 1916, the Articles of War were
enacted and used as authority to establish military jurisdiction over a wide range of offenses.
Articles of War, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 619, 650-70 (1916). Some of the articles forbade offenses of
a military nature, such as desertions on the field of battle, mutiny, and striking a superior
officer. 10 U.S.C. §§ 885(a)(2), 899(1), 894(a)(1), 890(1) (1982). The articles also included
two "all-purpose" provisions which were not limited to clearly military offenses. They cur-
rently appear as article 133, "Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman" and article
134, the "General Article." 10 U.S.C. §§ 933, 934 (1982).
23. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. McCoy, Equal Justice, supra note 21, at 7.
27. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
28. Id. at 123.
29. Articles of War, ch. 418, art. 93 (1916).
19891
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non-military, non-capital offenses committed by soldiers during
peacetime.
Another United States Supreme Court decision, Johnson v.
Sayre,30 served as strong authority until O'Callahan that regular
Army and Navy personnel are subject to military law at all times."1
The Court held that "All persons in the military or naval service of
the United States are subject to the military law; the members of the
regular army and navy, at all times; the militia, so long as they are
in such service." 82
Some sixty-eight years later, the Court relied on Johnson in de-
ciding court-martial jurisdiction over soldiers for crimes committed
during peacetime. In Thompson v. Willingham,"3 the petitioner had
been convicted by general court-martial for premeditated murder,
larceny, and reckless driving."' The petitioner sought relief from the
court-martial on the basis that his offenses had been committed in
time of peace and, therefore, he was entitled to a fifth amendment-
type trial. 8 The circuit court held that petitioner's contention that
servicemen were entitled during peacetime to jury and grand jury
protections of the fifth amendment was without merit. The Court
based its holding on Johnson."
Likewise, in Wright v. Markley,"7 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a denial of habeas corpus relief to a soldier who had
been convicted of rape by a general court-martial. 3 The court held
that military trials are not governed by fifth and sixth amendment
procedures and that a general court-martial has jurisdiction to try a
rape case in peacetime.3 9
The Court did not overturn its century-old approval of court-
martial jurisdiction based on status as a soldier until the decision in
30. 158 U.S. 109 (1895). Sayre, a paymaster's clerk in the United States Navy, had
been charged with embezzlement of money belonging to the United States and had been con-
victed by a general court-martial. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus; the circuit
court granted the writ on the finding that Sayre "was unlawfully restrained of his liberty,
because [he was] detained under a sentence to an infamous punishment, not in time of war or
public danger, without indictment or trial. by jury, in violation of the 5th Article of Amend-
ment of the Constitution." Id. at 113.
31. Id. at 114.
32. Id.
33. 318 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963).
34. 10 U.S.C. §§ 911, 918, 921 (1982).
35. Thompson, 318 F.2d 657 (3d Cir 1963).
36. Id. at 658.
37. 351 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1965).
38. Id. at 593.
39. Id.
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O'Callahan v. Parker.
2. Jurisdiction Based on "Service Connection" Under
O'Callahan v. Parker and Relford v. Commandant, United States
Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth
Petitioner O'Callahan, a United States Army sergeant, while on
an evening pass from his army post in Hawaii and in civilian cloth-
ing, broke into a hotel room, assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl, and
attempted to commit rape. Following his apprehension, city police,
on learning that O'Callahan was in the Armed Forces, delivered him
to the military police. After an interrogation, O'Callahan confessed.
He was charged with attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault
with attempt to rape, in violation of articles 80,40 130,"' and 13442 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
O'Callahan was tried by court-martial and convicted on all
counts. O'Callahan was dishonorably discharged and sentenced to 10
years at hard labor and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. His
conviction was affirmed by the Army Board of Review and, later, by
the United States Court of Military Appeals."' O'Callahan later
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States Dis-
trict Court " 'claiming' that the court-martial was without jurisdic-
tion to try him for non-military offenses committed while off-post."""
The District Court denied relief and the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
40. Article 80 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1982) provides
in part:
(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter,
amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to
effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to commit any offense pun-
ishable by this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, unless
otherwise specifically prescribed.
41. Article 130, 10 U.S.C. § 930 (1982) provides:
Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters the building or struc-
ture of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein is guilty of
housebreaking and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
42. Article 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1982) provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken
cognizance of by a general, special or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that
court.
43. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969).
44. Id.
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peals affirmed." 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to
the question:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War, Tit. 10,
U.S.C. § 801 et seq., have jurisdiction to try a member of the
Armed Forces who is charged with commission of a crime cog-
nizable in a civilian court and having no military significance,
alleged to have been committed off-post and while on leave, thus
depriving him of his constitutional rights to indictment by a
grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court?"'
The Court held that a crime must be "service connected" for it to
fall under military jurisdiction. The Court wanted to prevent " 'cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger,' as used in the Fifth
Amendment,. . . [from being] expanded to deprive every member of
the armed forces of [the due process benefits of] indictment by a
grand jury and trial by a jury of his peers."4
O'Callahan eliminated the status-based jurisdiction of the mili-
tary courts and took a major step toward minimizing the deprivation
of equal justice suffered by soldiers.48 By using "status" as the stan-
dard for courts-martial jurisdiction, Justice Douglas concluded that
O'Callahan had been denied "first, the benefit of an indictment by a
grand jury and second, a trial by jury before a civilian court as guar-
anteed by the Sixth Amendment49 and by Article III, section 250 of
45. Id. The circuit court of appeals affirmed per curiam the denial of the writ of habeas
corpus, not on the merits but because the issues presented by O'Callahan were scheduled for
briefing and arguing before the Court of Military Appeals. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v.
Parker, 372 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1967), reargued, 390 F.2d 360, 361 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 822, rev'd, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
46. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 261.
47. Id. at 272-73.
48. McCoy, Equal Justice, supra note 21, at 13.
49. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 , cl. 3 states:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
[Vol. 29
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the Constitution .... ,1
Justice Douglas found that the military justice system was
without equivalent guarantees."2 Although he recognized that there
was "a genuine need for special military courts," he also determined
that "courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing
with the nice subtleties of constitutional law."6 Thus, Justice Doug-
las, quoting Toth v. Quarles," concluded that jurisdiction of courts-
martial should be limited to "the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed."' 5
The majority opinion identified several factors which indicated
that O'Callahan's crime lacked service connection; they are:
(1) the accused's proper absence from the military base;
(2) the lack of connection between the accused's military
duties and the alleged crimes;
(3) the fact that the crimes were not committed on a mili-
tary post or enclave;
(4) the victim of the crimes was not performing duties re-
lating to the military;
(5) the situs of the crime was not an armed camp;
(6) the alleged offenses dealt with peacetime offenses, not
with authority stemming from the war power;
(7) the civil courts were open;
(8) the offenses were committed within the territorial limits
of the United States, not in an occupied zone or foreign country;
51. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 262.
52. Justice Douglas states:
And conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of
justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that
military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such
way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has
deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts. For instance, the
Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions
in military trials. They are appointed by military commanders and may be re-
moved at will. Nor does the Constitution protect their salaries as it does judicial
salaries. Strides have been made toward making courts-martials less subject to
the will if the executive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately
controls them. But from the very nature of things, courts have more indepen-
dence in passing on the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals.
O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 262-63 (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955)).
53. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265.
54. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
55. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265 (quoting Toth, 350 U.S. at 22-23).
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(9) the offenses did not involve any questions of flouting
military authority;
(10) the offenses did not involve the security of a military
post; and
(11) the offenses did not involve the integrity of military
property. 56
By limiting court-martial jurisdiction to "service connection," the
Court's intent was to restrict, to the greatest extent possible, military
jurisdiction over crimes committed within the territorial limits of the
United States during peacetime." According to the Court, the "sta-
tus" of an individual was just the "beginning of the inquiry" into
service connection.
5 8
Two short years after its decision in O'Callahan, the Supreme
Court again addressed the question of court-martial jurisdiction over
crimes committed by military personnel during peacetime in Relford
v. Commandant.9 The petitioner in Relford was convicted by gen-
eral court-martial on two specifications of kidnapping and two speci-
fications of rape. Each of the offenses occurred on an Army installa-
tion. One of the rape and kidnapping victims was an Army
dependant; the other was a civilian employee of the Army. At the
time of the offenses, the petitioner was on active duty with the Army
and was not on a leave or other "non-duty" status.
The Court in Relford basically applied the standards enumer-
ated in O'Callahan and added a twelfth factor requiring that the
offense be "among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian
courts.""0 The Court noted that its list of factors in O'Callahan in-
dicates "that it chose to take an ad hoc approach to cases where trial
by court-martial is challenged."6 1 When the Court turned to the fac-
tors in Relford's case that were relevant to the issue of court-martial
jurisdiction, the Court determined that there were as many of the
O'Callahan factors present as there were ones missing.62 Thus, the
Court held that the crimes with which Relford was charged were
triable by a military court.
The Court's use of the O'Callahan factors and its enunciation
56. Id. at 273-74.
57. Thwing, Service Connection: A Bridge Over Troubled Waters, THE ARMY LAW.,
May 1986, at 20, 21.
58. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 267.
59. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
60. Id. at 365.
61. Id. at 365-66.
62. Id. at 366.
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of nine additional factors6" amplifying the concept of service connec-
tion did much to promote the concept and application of service con-
nection.64 The Court recognized that any subsequent analysis of
court-martial jurisdiction would be an ad hoc approach.
For seventeen years, O'Callahan and Relford were the stan-
dards used by the courts to determine court-martial subject matter
jurisdiction. Then, in 1987, the Supreme Court handed down the
decision of Solorio v. United States.65
3. The Return to Jurisdiction Based Solely on the Military
Defendant's Status as a Member of the Armed Forces Under Solorio
v. United States
In Solorio, the petitioner, a Coast Guardsman, was charged
with various offenses against two young girls, including attempted
rape, indecent assault, and indecent liberties. The offenses allegedly
63. Id. at 367. The Court enunciated nine additional factors amplifying the concept of
service connection:
(a) The essential and obvious interest of the military in the security of persons
and of property on the military enclave ...
(b) The responsibility of the military commander for maintenance of order in
his command and his commander's authority to maintain that order. [Citations
omitted]
(c) The impact and adverse effect that a crime committed against a person or
property on a military base, thus violating the base's very security, has upon
morale, discipline, reputation and integrity of the base itself, upon its personnel,
and upon the military operation and the military mission.
(d) The conviction that [article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution of the
United States,] vesting in Congress the power "To make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," means, in appropriate ar-
eas beyond the purely military offense, more than the mere power to arrest a
serviceman offender and turn him over to the civil authorities ...
(e) The distinct possibility that civil courts, particularly nonfederal courts, will
have less than complete interest, concern, and capacity for all the cases that
vindicate the military's disciplinary authority within its own community. [Cita-
tions omitted]
(f) [Tihe presence of factors such as geographical and military relationships
have important contrary significance [in favor of service-connection).
(g) [H]istorically, a crime against the person of one associated with the post was
subject even to the General Article. ...
(h) The misreading and undue restriction of O'Callahan if it were interpreted
as confining the court-martial to the purely military offenses that have no coun-
terpart in nonmilitary criminal law.
(i) [The] inability appropriately and meaningfully to draw any line between a
post's strictly military areas and its nonmilitary areas, or between a serviceman-
defendant's on-duty and off-duty activities and hours on the post.
Id. at 367-69.
64. Thwing, supra note 57, at 23.
65. 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
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took place between March of 1982 and June of 1984. The alleged
victims were between the ages of ten and twelve during the period
when the offenses allegedly occurred. The fathers of the two victims
were also active duty members of the Coast Guard. The offenses
purportedly took place in Juneau, Alaska, where both Solorio and
the victims resided in civilian housing; one of the victim's family
lived next door to Solorio and his family and the other lived a half-
mile away. The families lived in civilian quarters because govern-
ment housing was unavailable.
Information concerning the alleged offenses was not provided by
the girls until both they and Solorio had been transferred to different
Coast Guard duty stations outside Alaska. Solorio had been trans-
ferred to Governors Island, New York, where he was charged with
the Alaska offenses, as well as similar offenses involving two other
minor daughters of Coast Guardsmen which allegedly had occurred
in government quarters at Governors Island from November 20,
1984 to January 5, 1985.66
After the general court-martial was convened in New York,
Solorio moved to dismiss the charges for crimes committed in Alaska
on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Supreme
Court's decisions in O'Callahan and Relford.67 The judge granted
the motion to dismiss, ruling that the Alaska offenses were "not suf-
ficiently service connected to be tried in the military criminal justice
system."6 The United States Coast Guard Court of Military Re-
view reversed the trial judge's order and reinstated the charges."9
The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed the
Court of Military Review, concluding that the Alaska offenses were
service connected within the meaning of O'Callahan and Relford.70
The Court stated that "not every off-base offense against a soldier's
dependent is service-connected," the court reasoned that "sex of-
fenses against young children . . . have a continuing effect on the
victims and their families and ultimately on the morale of any mili-
tary unit or organization to which the family member is assigned.
'7 1
Other factors that the court weighed included: "the interest of Alaska
civilian officials in prosecuting petitioner; the hardship on the vic-
tims; and the benefits to petitioner and the Coast Guard from trying
66. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 251, 252 (1986).
67. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2926.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Solorio, 21 M.J. at 256).
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the Alaska and New York offenses together."'7 1
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certio-
rari to review the decision of the Court of Military Appeals. 73 The
Court affirmed the decision of the appeals court holding that "[t]he
jurisdiction of a court-martial depends solely on the accused's status
as a member of the Armed Forces, and not on the 'service connec-
tion' of the offenses charged," 74 thus overruling O'Callahan.
Justice Rehnquist found that "[t]he plain meaning of Article I,
section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution-which grants Congress ple-
nary power [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval forces-supports the military status test."' 75 The
constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the armed
forces appears in the same section as the provisions granting Con-
gress authority to regulate commerce, coin money, and declare war."
Justice Rehnquist also found that, "[o]n its face; there is no indica-
tion that the grant of power in clause 14 was any less plenary than
the grants of other authority to Congress in the same section."' 7
Thus, "Congress' power embraces the authority to regulate the con-
duct of persons who are actually members of the armed services." '7 8
In his dissent, Justice Marshall79 asserts that the majority opin-
ion disregards the limitations the Bill of Rights imposes on the reach
of article I, section 8, clause 14. Justice Marshall quotes the Court's
opinion in Toth, stating, "[T]he constitutional grant of power to
Congress to regulate the armed forces . . . itself does not empower
Congress to deprive people of trials under the Bill of Rights safe-
guards, and we are not willing to hold that power to circumvent
those safeguards should be inferred through the Necessary and
Proper Clause."80
Recognizing that the fifth amendment rights to grand jury and
trial by jury are limited in application to the military, Justice Mar-
72. Id. (quoting Solorio, 21 M.J. at 256-57).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2925.
75. Id. Justice Rehnquist noted Justice Harlan's dissent in O'Callahan in which the
latter states that there is no evidence in the debates over the adoption of the Constitution that
the Framers intended the language of clause 14 to be accorded anything other than its plain
meaning. Id. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 277 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 states: "To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
77. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2928.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2933. Justice Marshall's dissent was also joined by Justice Brennan and Jus-
tice Blackmun who joined in all but the last paragraph. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2934 (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21-22 (1955)).
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shall contended that the amendment's exception covers only "cases
arising in the land and naval forces." 81 The amendment makes no
reference to the status of the individual. Additionally, "[tlhe protec-
tion afforded individuals by the fifth and sixth amendments ...
ranks very high in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards"82 and,
therefore, "trial by court-martial should be limited to the least possi-
ble power adequate to the end proposed."88
In concluding his dissent, Justice Marshall chastised the major-
ity opinion for its blatant disregard of stare decisis. Justice Marshall
expressed his fear that the majority opinion would subject every
member of the armed forces to court-martial jurisdiction-without
grand jury indictment or trial by jury-for any offense, regardless of
its lack of connection to "military discipline, morale and fitness." '84
III. ANALYSIS
A. Return to Jurisdiction Based on Soldier Status-only Under
Solorio
The Court's decision in Solorio was the culmination of an ero-
sion of the soldiers' right to civilian trials for predominately, if not
purely civilian offenses.85 Solorio reversed the precedents established
by O'Callahan and Relford and expanded court-martial subject
matter jurisdiction far beyond the constitutional limits enunciated in
those cases.
O'Callahan held that a military tribunal may not try a soldier
charged with a crime that has no service-connection. Relford held
that service-connection must be determined on an ad hoc basis.
Solorio simply returned to the pre-O'Callahan standard permitting
military courts to find subject-matter jurisdiction over offenses based
solely on the status of an individual as a member of the armed ser-
vices. The Solorio military status-only requirement does not provide
soldiers any protection of their right to a civilian trial for predomi-
81. Id. at 2934 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 2935.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The Court of Military Appeals has, case-by-case, eviscerated the O'Callahan and
Relford decisions by adopting a broad definition of service-connection. The flexible service-
connection test allows military courts to make jurisdictional decisions based on any single fac-
tor or combination of factors, tangible or intangible, proven or presumed. See, e.g., United
States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980) (the Court of Military Appeals extended mili-
tary subject-matter jurisdiction to all drug offenses committed by soldiers); United States v.
Scott, 21 M.J. 345 (C.M.A. 1986) (the Court of Military Appeals has indicated that all of-
fenses committed by officers are service-connected).
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nately or purely civilian offenses. The Court's holding suggested that
any asserted impact on the military, regardless of how remote or
indirect, will be sufficient to outweigh the soldier's interest in the
greater constitutional protections of a civilian trial.
How far is the court willing to take the status-only test? Does
the Court mean to say that civilian offenses committed by soldiers
who are reservists or reserve officer training cadets while not on ac-
tive duty can be tried by military courts? The Court did indicate that
court-martial subject matter jurisdiction can be stretched to unrea-
sonable and unconstitutional lengths to encompass even these
soldiers.86
For example, suppose that Mr. Smith is a reservist serving his
two week yearly obligation with the United States Army. Mr. Smith
is, by profession, an investment banker for Big Money Investors.
Mr. Smith's rank in the Army is private first class (PFC). During
his two week tour with the Army, the Securities and Exchange
Commission reveals that PFC Smith has been involved in some in-
sider-trading deals. In this instance, under Solorio, PFC Smith's sta-
tus as a member of the armed forces is sufficient for the military
court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over his purely civilian
offense. Thus, PFC Smith is deprived of his right to indictment by a
grand jury and his right to a trial by a jury of his peers.
The foregoing example illustrates that with the Court's return
to the status-only test, the guidelines and limitations required by the
service-connection test are no longer relevant. There is seemingly
very little to prevent military courts from extending their jurisdiction
over purely civilian offenses committed by civilian military employ-
ees or dependents. While some case law currently prohibits the exer-
cise of military jurisdiction over civilian military employees and
dependants,87 Solorio may be looked to as precedent for overturning
those cases.
B. Solorio as a Reaction to the Difficulty of Using the Service-
connection Standard
On one level, Solorio may simply have been a reaction to the
difficulty and uncertainty that application of the O'Callahan and
86. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2930.
87. Currently, neither employees of the Armed Forces overseas, (McElroy v. United
States ex rel. Guargliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)),
nor civilian dependants of military personnel accompanying them overseas, (Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 362 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)), may be tried
by court-martial.
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Relford factors and considerations have brought to the military jus-
tice system. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in O'Callahan, stated that
"the infinite permutations of possibly relevant factors are bound to
create confusion and proliferate litigation over the jurisdiction issue
in each instance.""
As if in response to Justice Harlan's criticism, the Court in
Relford enumerated twelve factors and nine additional considera-
tions which were to serve as guidelines in determining service-con-
nection and subject-matter jurisdiction."
Yet, even with the Relford factors and considerations, the
mental gymnastics used by practitioners and courts in applying the
standards evidenced their frustration with the service-connection
test.90 As a result, in the years following Relford, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals gradually eroded the intent of O'Callahan (i.e., limit-
ing court-martial jurisdiction over civilian offenses to those which are
service-connected) by broadly construing the definition of service-
connection.91 Courts are looking at what effect, in general terms, a
civilian, off-post offense has upon the combat readiness, efficiency,
discipline, morale or reputation of a military installation and its per-
sonnel.92 Using this type of quasi-service-connection analysis easily
allows the conclusion that any civilian offense is of "special military
significance." 98
The erosion of the O'Callahan-Relford standard was one factor
that led to the Court's decision in Solorio to base court-martial juris-
diction on status only.9" Adopting a broad definition of service-con-
nection, it stated that any offense committed by a soldier, whether
on-post or off-post and whether against another soldier or civilian,
has an impact on the armed forces.95 At the very least, the military is
deprived of the soldier's services while he is defending himself and
serving his sentence." Moreover, the soldier's offense casts a bad
light on the military when his uniformed status is exposed. 97 Thus,
any soldier offense has an effect on the combat readiness, efficiency,
discipline, morale and reputation of the armed forces. The status-
88. 395 U.S. 258, 284 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. See supra notes 56 and 63 and accompanying text.
90. See generally Thwing, supra note 57, at 28.
91. See infra text accompanying note 100.
92. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
93. United States v. Beeker, 18 C.M.A. 563, 565, 40 C.M.R. 275, 277 (1969).
94. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2933.
95. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 92, at 17.
96. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 92, at 17.
97. Id.
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only test facilitates the practitioner and the court's analysis of court-
martial subject-matter jurisdiction by providing a bright-line stan-
dard which simplifies the jurisdiction issue.
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Solorio criticizes the argu-
ment that simpler is better. Justice Marshall states: "It is true that
the test requires a careful, case-specific factual inquiry. But this is
not beyond the capacity of military courts." 98
Any soldier being tried by court-martial is being deliberately
deprived of the procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. The Constitution specifically states that fifth and sixth amend-
ment protections must be provided in any case not "arising in" the
armed forces." Those protections cannot be lightly swept aside sim-
ply because an individual is a member of the armed forces. Simpler
is not better. Military courts, regardless of their similarity to civilian
courts, were not intended100 and are not equipped to provide the
procedural protections that are characteristic of civilian courts.
C. Justifications for Limiting Court-martial Subject-matter
Jurisdiction
The O'Callahan Court summarized the limitations of military
courts: "While the Court of Military Appeals takes cognizance of
some constitutional rights of the accused who are court-martialed,
courts-martials as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with
the nice subtleties of constitutional law."10 1
Under the Solorio status-only requirement for court-martial ju-
risdiction, no thought is given to the balancing of the accused's inter-
ests in the greater constitutional protections of a civilian trial and the
military's interest in maintaining discipline and order. Regardless of
how trivial and unrelated a soldier's offense may be to the military
mission of readiness, efficiency, and discipline, an accused may be
stripped of the basic procedural protections guaranteed by the Con-
stitution "simply because they doffed their civilian clothes."1 2 In or-
der to deprive a soldier of a basic constitutional right, the armed
services must be required to point to a legitimate military interest
that justifies the deprivation.
The primary importance of O'Callahan was that it provided
98. Id. at 2941 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
101. 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
102. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 304 (1983) (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights
and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)).
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the proper balance between the constitutional rights of soldiers
against the military's interest in trying the case in a court-martial.
More specifically, the importance of an accused's right to the protec-
tions of an article III court-right to indictment by a grand jury and
right to trial by jury-is weighed against the legitimate need of the
military to maintain order and discipline. The service-connection re-
quirement in O'Callahan helped to insure that the scope of military
courts was limited to the least possible power deemed absolutely es-
sential for the maintenance of order and discipline during peacetime.
Court-martial jurisdiction must be limited because its overriding
purpose is to maintain discipline. Its purpose is not to provide consti-
tutional protections to the accused.
Many improvements in the military justice system have taken
place in the seventeen years since O'Callahan. Some improvements
include the Military Rules of Evidence of 1980, which were taken in
large part from the Federal Rules of Evidence. Additional improve-
ments were made regarding the quality of legal representation an
accused receives. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), the accused is entitled to an appointed licensed military
attorney and may also retain a civilian attorney (at no cost to the
United States Government) to represent him.103
However, many of the basic deficiencies recognized in
O'Callahan still remain. Additionally, recent changes have worked
to the detriment of the military accused. For example, the Military
Justice Act of 198110" for the first time allows commanders to invol-
untarily place certain soldiers on leave-without-pay status during
their appeals.1 5 The 1981 amendments also provide that the sixty-
day time period for seeking further appeal can be started by con-
structive, rather than personal service of Court of Military Review
decisions.1°6 The Military Justice Act of 198307 allows convening
authorities108 to execute any punishments, except death or punitive
discharge, without conducting any legal review of the court-martial
or taking any action on the findings.'0 9
In O'Callahan, the majority was concerned with the impartial-
ity of the military judge and the fact that the military accused in a
103. 10 U.S.C. § 838 (1982) (amended 1983).
104. 95 Stat. 1085 (1981).
105. 10 U.S.C. § 876(a) (1982) (amended 1983).
106. 10 U.S.C. § 867(c)(2) (1982).
107. 97 Stat. 1393 (1983).
108. See infra notes 132-138 and accompanying text.
109. 10 U.S.C. § 860(c) (added by amendment 1983).
[Vol. 29
MILITARY JURISDICTION
court-martial is not truly tried by a jury of his peers."' The major-
ity was also concerned with the fact that the convening authority, a
non-lawyer, has extraordinary control over law enforcement, prose-
cution, and adjudicative functions and may intentionally or uninten-
tionally exert unlawful command influence on the criminal proceed-
ings.'." Those concerns are still valid today.
Military judges, although they certainly may be honest, are
nonetheless military officers who must answer to those above them.
Much has been done to make military judges more independent of
command influence. Today, military judges are appointed by and
serve at the discretion of the Judge Advocate General,"' not the mil-
itary commander as was the case during O'Callahan. However, un-
like article III judges,"1 military judges still do not serve under the
protection of life tenure and serve for limited periods of time. Thus,
military judges do not have the opportunity to gain experience and
develop judicial temperament.
Likewise, courts-martial are not tried by a jury of the accused's
peers. A court-martial is tried by a panel of officers empowered to
convict by a two-thirds vote, except where the death penalty is
mandatory."" The panel is generally not required to be larger than
five members, even for the most serious crimes.1 5 If the accused is
an enlisted person he may request that at least one-third of the panel
members are enlisted personnel.1 6 In reality, only senior enlisted
personnel (non-commissioned officers) will be selected to serve on the
panel.
The convening authority hand-picks the members of the panel
from his own command."" Thus, there is potential for improper
command influence by the convening authority on the panel mem-
bers because their officer evaluation reports (similar to job perform-
ance evaluations) are prepared by the same person who decides that
110. 395 U.S. 258, 262-64 (1969).
111. Id. at 264.
112. 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1982) (amended 1983).
113. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Ser-
vices, Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
114. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a) (1982).
115. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1982) (amended 1983).
116. Id. § 825.
117. Id. § 825(d)(2).
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the accused should be court-martialed.
The accused is entitled to only one peremptory challenge to the
hand-picked panel." 8 This is a significant difference from the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require that each side be
given twenty peremptory challenges if the offense charged is punish-
able by death. " 9 If the offense is punishable by imprisonment of
more than one year, the government is entitled to six peremptory
challenges and the defendant, or defendants jointly, to ten chal-
lenges. 2 If the offense is punishable by imprisonment for not more
than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled to three chal-
lenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow the
defendants additional challenges and permit them to be exercised
separately or jointly."' Thus, it is evident that a court-martial panel
fails to meet the minimal requirements of the sixth amendment.
The area. of greatest concern deals with the extraordinary con-
trol and influence the convening authority has over the accused's
criminal process. The convening authority is a military commander
who generally is a non-lawyer with little or no legal knowledge or
education. The convening authority is charged by the UCMJ with
judicial authority to create a court-martial. 2 Thus, a convening au-
thority can initiate and direct investigations within his command.'
He can authorize searches without complying with the procedural
requirement like those proscribed by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.' If charges result from the investigation, the convening
authority may refer them to a court-martial. 2 He may grant immu-
nity to accomplices and witnesses. 2 He may bargain with the ac-
cused over terms of pretrial agreements 2 ' and approve the sentence
adjudged.' 28
In serious cases, an article 32 pre-trial investigation may be re-
quired. "'9 An officer is appointed by the special court-martial con-
118. 10 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1982).
119. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-824 (1982).
123. Manual for Court Martial, Rule for Courts Martial, Rule 303 (1984) [hereinafter
R.C.M.].
124. Manual for Court Martial, Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 315 (1984).
125. R.C.M., supra note 123, at Rules 404 and 407.
126. R.C.M., supra note 123, at Rule 704.
127. R.C.M., supra note 123, at Rule 705.
128. R.C.M., supra note 123, at Rule 1107.
129. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1982).
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vening authority.' " The general court-martial convening author-
ity"' is not bound by the investigating officer's finding or
recommendations and may ignore them."3 ' Thus, the convening au-
thority can refer the charges to court-martial as long as he reasona-
bly believes the evidence supports the charges.' In fact, the conven-
ing authority may even eliminate the required article 32
investigation by referring the charges to a special court-martial
which has the authority to administer severe punishment."
While the UCMJ prohibits unlawful command influence, " it
may nevertheless occur. Illegal command influence can deny an ac-
cused his constitutional right to a fair trial. Unfortunately, neither
Congress nor the military courts have found a way to remedy the
problem. In fact, it is very unlikely that courts-martial will ever be
free from unlawful command influence.
Military law has always been and continues to be primarily an
instrument of discipline, not justice. " 6 The primary business of ar-
mies and navies is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occa-
sion arise. The trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely inci-
dental to the armed forces' primary fighting function. Justice
Douglas pointed out in his opinion in O'Callahan that the "exigen-
cies of military discipline require the existence of a special system of
military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protection
deemed essential in Article III trials need apply.' ' 3 7 However, the
expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain carries
with it a threat to liberty. Military courts must be restricted to the
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential for maintaining
discipline among soldiers.
130. A special court-martial is empowered to administer confinement for six months, a
bad conduct discharge, forfeiture of two-thirds pay, and reduction to the lowest enlisted rank.
10 U.S.C. § 819 (1982).
131. General courts-martial may render unlimited punishment. R.C.M., supra note
123, at Rule 501(a)(1)(A).
132. R.C.M., supra note 123, at Rules 405(a), 407(a).
133. Article 34 of the U.C.M.J. provides, however, that a commander must receive ad-
vice from his staff judge advocate that the charge is supported by evidence. 10 U.S.C. § 834
(1982).
134. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1982).
135. Id. § 837.
136. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969) (quoting Glasser, Justice and
Captain Levy, 12 COLUM. FORUM 46, 49 (1969)).
137. 395 U.S. at 261.
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IV. PROPOSAL
The primary complaint regarding the O'Callahan/Relford ser-
vice-connection test is that courts and practitioners find it is too un-
certain and difficult to apply. There is no easy or quick solution to
the problem of how to determine court-martial jurisdiction. The sta-
tus-only requirement of Solorio should not be employed simply be-
cause it is the easiest way for the military to determine and obtain
court-martial jurisdiction over soldiers. Again, simplest is not neces-
sarily best.
A. End Concurrent Jurisdiction
One solution is to completely end concurrent jurisdiction of mil-
itary courts.138 Only if an offense is purely military in nature would
a military court have jurisdiction. If an offense can in any way be
tried by an article III court, then the civilian court would have juris-
diction. If this solution is employed, military courts would undoubt-
edly be restricted to the least possible power.
Problems with this solution arise when an offense that could be
dealt with in civilian court is truly a military matter. For example,
one soldier may strike another soldier on a military installation. The
assault could be dealt with in a civilian court if the injured party
filed suit against the aggressor. However, this matter seems more
appropriate for military courts since both soldiers were on the mili-
tary installation and their actions may have an effect on the mainte-
nance of order and discipline within their unit.
B. Alternative Jurisdictional System of Civilian-military Justice
A second possible solution would require Congress to create a
system of civilian-military justice. Military courts would have juris-
diction over purely military offenses, i.e., desertion, insubordination
and the like. Civilian courts would have jurisdiction over purely ci-
vilian offenses, writing bad checks, fraud and the like. In the event
that both courts claim to have concurrent jurisdiction (e.g., drugs)
federal courts will establish which court will take jurisdiction. On
one side, federal courts would balance the individual's interest in
having the constitutional and procedural protections of a civilian
court and the civilian court's interest in retaining jurisdiction over
the soldier's offense. On the other side, the court will look at the
military's interest in trying the case in court-martial. Federal courts
138. For the definition of concurrent jurisdiction, see supra note 10.
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would use the service-connection test of O'Callahan and Relford to
determine who has the overriding interest in the litigation. Both the
military and the civilian courts would be bound by the federal court
decision.
The concurrent system of civilian-military justice combines the
best of the no concurrent jurisdiction solution and the service-connec-
tion analysis. Military courts would maintain jurisdiction over those
offenses in which they have the greatest interest. Yet, military courts
would also have the opportunity to argue that they should be able to
exercise jurisdiction over those offenses which may be civilian in na-
ture, but have significance with regard to the preservation of military
discipline and order. Civilian courts, on the other hand, would also
retain jurisdiction over those offenses in which they have the greatest
interest. However, they too would have the opportunity to argue that
their interest in an offense takes precedence over the military's
interest.
The soldier is also benefited in that he is assured that he is at
least being afforded a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of
jurisdiction in federal court. Federal court is free of the influence of
the convening authority. Judges in the civilian courts have greater
independence to determine the constitutionality of depriving the sol-
dier of his right to an article III court, his right to indictment by a
grand jury and his right to trial by jury. Most importantly, the
power of the military court is restricted to the narrowest jurisdiction
possible. 9
The person most interested in who retains jurisdiction over his
offense is, naturally, the soldier. He is the individual who is deprived
of his procedural guarantees under the Constitution if he is court-
martialed. The soldier is also the individual that must pay for coun-
sel if he is hailed into civilian courts.
The solution may not be simple. However, when the difference
between whether a crime is tried in civilian or in military court is
the difference between being afforded due process rights or not,
courts should not succumb to the temptation of embracing solutions
139. While any one of these solutions may work, the reality is that military and civilian
courts do not argue over who has jurisdiction over a particular offense. In many cases, the
military court gladly allows the civilian court to take jurisdiction over a matter. Military
judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys are too overworked and have limited access to parale-
gal and clerical assistance to take on an unlimited flow of cases. In other matters, civilian
courts are very willing to allow military courts to retain jurisdiction over a matter because the
military punishments are more severe. Similarly, civilian judges, district attorneys and public
defenders have so many cases that they are glad to lessen their load.
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which offer only administrative convenience.
V. CONCLUSION
Under Solorio v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant-soldier, holding that
court-martial jurisdiction will be based solely on the status of that
individual as a member of "land and naval forces." Prior to this
decision, military courts were required to prove that the soldier's of-
fense was service-connected using the O'Callahan/Relford factors
and considerations. However, under Solorio, service-connection is no
longer significant. The status of the accused as a member of the
armed forces is the only element required in determining court-mar-
tial jurisdiction.
By adopting the status-only test, the Court has overturned sev-
enteen years of stare decisis and has expanded court-martial subject
matter jurisdiction far beyond the constitutional limits spelled out in
O'Callahan and Relford. The Court refuses to recognize that
soldiers have an interest in preserving their right to the greater con-
stitutional protections of a civilian trial which must be balanced
against the proper interests of the military in maintaining discipline
and order.
Many of the fears expressed by Justice Douglas in his
O'Callahan opinion and echoed by Justice Marshall in his dissent
in Solorio are still valid. Military law is an instrument of discipline,
not justice. The need to limit court-martial jurisdiction to its proper
domain is as great now as it was when O'Callahan and Relford
were decided. Since those cases were decided, no development in ei-
ther the military or society at large have justified the expansion of
court-martial jurisdiction over civilian offenses as allowed by Solorio.
The most reasonable solution to the dilemma of military court
jurisdiction is to create a system of civilian-military courts. The sys-
tem would allow civilian and military courts to exercise jurisdiction
over issues that are purely civilian and purely military, respectively.
Any disputes regarding jurisdiction would be settled by federal
courts. Most importantly, military court jurisdiction will be carefully
monitored by the federal courts who will insure that soldiers are not
unconstitutionally deprived of their procedural rights.
Maria Lugay Weidmann
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